Introduction to the Symposium: Executive Privilege and the Clinton Presidency by McPhie, Iain R.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 8 | Issue 3 Article 2
Introduction to the Symposium: Executive
Privilege and the Clinton Presidency
Iain R. McPhie
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Iain R. McPhie, Introduction to the Symposium: Executive Privilege and the Clinton Presidency, 8 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 535 (2000), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol8/iss3/2
SYMPOSIUM: EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND
THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY
INTRODUCTION
One outstanding characteristic of the Clinton presidency has been the
Administration's contentious relationships with the courts and with Congress. These
relationships have featured judicial and legislative inquiries that led to well-publicized
clashes over such constitutional issues as the President's immunity from civil suit and
what constitutes an impeachable offense. The Clinton Administration also has
produced several controversies involving executive privilege, affecting the power of
the executive branch and its ability to assert itself against the other branches. As the
Administration nears its end and the nation prepares to elect a new leader, this
Symposium examines the controversial executive privilege doctrine in light of the
interbranch conflicts of the Clinton presidency.
I. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: UNSETTLED DOCTRINE
"Executive privilege" refers to the ability of the President to withhold information
from the legislative and judicial branches in order to maintain secrecy.' This
authority is not mentioned in the Constitution or the constitutional debates. The lack
of an explicit provision of constitutional authority for executive privilege has led to
controversy over whether such a privilege even exists. During the last days of the
Nixon Administration, Raoul Berger published an influential study declaring
executive privilege a "constitutional myth."2 Berger favored a strict reading of the
text of the Constitution, and he interpreted its structure as making the president
subservient to Congress and granting Congress an absolute power of inquiry,
enabling it to supervise effectively the executive branch
' Executive privilege claims generally are classified into at least three different varieties
of privilege based on distinct kinds of considerations: a military, foreign affairs, and
diplomacy privilege; an informer's privilege; and an internal deliberations (or presidential
communications) privilege. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 4-15, at 770.
2 See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974).
See id at 344-47. For critiques of Berger's arguments, see MARK J. ROZELL,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
(1994); Louis Fisher & Mark J. Rozell, Raoul Berger on Executive Privilege,
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY (Summer 1998); Abraham D. Sofaer, Book Review,
88 HARV. L REV. 281 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Seedlings for the Forest, 83 YALE
L.J. 1730 (1974).
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In the landmark case of UnitedStates v. Nixon,4 the Supreme Court rejected that
view and held that the President has a constitutional right to withhold certain
information. In Nixon, the Court recognized the existence of executive privilege as
an inherent presidential power flowing from the nature of the enumerated powers in
the Constitution.5 The Court further held that it is the role of the Judiciary to decide
whether the President has executive privilege in a given case and, if so, what is the
scope of that privilege.6 The Court thereby also rejected the contention that the
Constitution provides an absolute privilege for all presidential communications.7
The Court in Nixon concluded that the executiye privilege is required in some
circumstances by the constitutional separation of powers doctrine.8 The Court,
however, has not identified precisely the scope of the privilege for most situations.
Instead, the scope of the privilege remains in tension because of the competing
demands created by the separation of powers: thejudicial branch's need for evidence;
the executive branch's need for confidentiality; and the legislative branch's need for
information.9
II. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION:
TESTING THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
In the aftermath of the Nixon administration and the Watergate scandal,
presidents were reluctant to assert executive privilege. Presidents Ford, Carter, and
Bush formally invoked the privilege only once, while President Reagan did so only
three times.'0 The Clinton Administration, by contrast, has produced a flurry of
activity involving executive privilege. This activity has included litigating executive
privilege claims against grand jury subpoenas and invoking the privilege against
congressional requests for information.
The most important executive privilege case litigated during the Clinton
Presidency involved documents subpoenaed by a grand jury investigating former
Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy." In finding a qualified privilege in that case,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court expanded the scope of the presidential
4 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
' See id. at 705-06; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 261 (1997).
6 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-05; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 260.
7 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at at 703; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 260.
See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706-06, 708.
9 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 195 (1997).
'0 See Ruth Marcus, Executive Privilege: An Old, Uphill Struggle; Clinton Unlikely
to Prevail on a Claim to Limit Testimony in Starr Probe, Some Specialists Say, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 1998, at A9.
" See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 8:3
SYMPOSIUM
communications privilege to cover communications made by presidential advisers in
the course of preparing advice for the President, even when the communications were
not made directly to the President." The court also created a test regarding the
showing of need required to overcome the privilege when asserted against a grand
jury subpoena.' 3
In a second case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia considered
the President's assertion of executive privilege to prevent senior advisers Bruce
Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal from testifying before Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr's grand jury investigating the Monica Lewinsky affair.'4 The court held that
the advisers' testimony was privileged presumptively even though it may have related
to a private, rather than official presidential matter.' The court, however, also
applied the District of Columbia Circuit's "showing of need" test from the Espy case
and found that the Office of the Independent Counsel met the requirements for
overcoming the executive privilege covering the testimony of Lindsey and
Blumenthal. 6 The Administration dropped the executive privilege claim on appeal.'
In addition to these conflicts in the courts, the Clinton Administration also has
invoked executive privilege several times in refusing congressional requests for
information. Administration officials have claimed executive privilege against
congressional committees investigating the firing of White House travel office
employees;" the Clintons' "Whitewater" real estate investment; 9 the denial of an
12 See id. at 751-52. To limit its expansion of the privilege, the court noted that, "the
privilege should apply only to communications authored or solicited and received by those
members of an immediate White House adviser's staff who have broad and significant
responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given the President on the
particular matter to which the communications relate." Id. at 752. The court further
cautioned that, "the privilege only applies to communications that these advisers and their
staff author or solicit and receive in the course of performing their function of advising the
President on official government matters." Id.
'" See id at 757 ("[Ilt is necessary to specifically demonstrate why it is likely that
evidence contained in presidential communications is important to the ongoing grand jury
investigation and why this evidence is not available from another source."). The court held
that the Independent Counsel successfully overcame the privilege in this case. See id at
761-62.
"4 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998), aff'd in part and
rev 'd in part sub nom., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Office
of the President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 525 U.S. 996 (1998).
's See id at 25-27.
16 See id. at 28-30.
" See Susan Schmidt & Ruth Marcus, Clinton Revives Claim Of Executive Privilege,
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1998, at Al.
"' See Ann Devroy & John E. Yang, White House Gives Congress 1,000 Pages of
Travel Office Papers, WASH. POST, May 31, 1996, at A 10.
'9 See Susan Schmidt, White House Rejects Subpoena; Whitewater Notes Called
Confidential, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1995, at AI. In this case, the White House formally
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Indian casino license;2" political killings in Haiti;2 a memo criticizing the
administration's drug policy;22 campaign finance abuses;23 and the decision to grant
clemency to sixteen members of Fuerzas Armada de Liberacion Natcional (FALN),
a terrorist Puerto Rican nationalist group.24
III. THE SYMPOSIUM
Given the Clinton Administration's aggressive-and sometimes abusive-use of
executive privilege, Mark Rozell takes the opportunity to review and critique Raoul
Berger's position that executive privilege lacks a constitutional foundation. Professor
Rozell responds to Berger's textual, historical, and structural arguments and
concludes that executive privilege is a legitimate, though not unlimited, constitutional
power. Professor Rozell proposes that the dilemma of executive privilege can be
resolved by the separation of powers doctrine, as the political branches settle
informational disputes between themselves, with limited judicial intervention.
Louis Fisher also recognizes executive privilege as a legitimate constitutional
power, but he argues that legal and political limits render the scope of the privilege
narrower than recent events seem to indicate. He points to early precedents set during
the Washington Administration and to congressional leverage over the executive
branch as evidence that Congress can force the executive branch to disclose more
information than is commonly believed. Dr. Fisher further argues that Congress's
need for information to govern supports an investigatory power that trumps the
executive branch's claim to exclusive control of information in national security and
foreign affairs cases.
Neil Kinkopf focuses on thejudicial treatment of executive privilege claims, and
the courts' use of a legal framework based on the separation of powers doctrine.
Professor Kinkopf notes that the separation of powers doctrine unifies executive
privilege claims with other related claims made by the Clinton Administration,
claimed the documents in question were protected under the attorney-client privilege, but
also noted that they were protected by executive privilege. See id
20 See George Lardner, Jr., White House Seeks to Keep Indian Casino Memos Secret,
WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1997, at A2.
2 See Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Keeps Papers On Haiti From House; Executive
Privilege Invoked in Panel's Probe of Killings, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1996, at A20.
22 See Peter Baker & Pierre Thomas, GOP Steps Up Callfor Drug Memo Release; Dole,
Kemp, Gingrich Attack Clinton for Executive Privilege Stance, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1996,
at A12.
23 See Guy Gugliotta, White House Averts Contempt Action on Finance Probe
Subpoenas, WASH. POST, May 21, 1997, at A14.
14 See Charles Babington & Juliet Eilperin, No Letup In Probes Of Clinton Presidency;
Executive Privilege Claim in Clemency Case Angers GOP, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1999,




including the government attorney-client privilege and temporary presidential
immunity from civil suit. He argues that the courts have misapplied the separation
of powers doctrine in ruling on the Clinton claims by treating differently claims made
in the judicial and legislative arenas: Because federal court jurisdiction is based on
statutes, privilege claims in thejudicial arena implicate the legislative, not thejudicial
constitutional position.
Turning to the political aspects of executive privilege, Jonathan Entin discusses
the negotiation of privilege disputes afterthe Clinton Administration. Professor Entin
offers structural and practical arguments for preferring negotiation over litigation of
such disputes. Although noting that the Clinton Administration's lack of success in
litigating similar disputes may have weakened the presidency to some degree,
Professor Entin remains optimistic regarding the prospects for interbranch
accommodation, even under divided government.
Neal Katyal explores the distinction drawn between the public and private lives
of the President, particularly in the Paula Jones and Monica Lewinsky cases. He
argues that the Administration's difficulties in asserting executive privilege claims
following these cases demonstrate that the public/private distinction is not entirely
valid. Professor Katyal proposes that presidents have only a limited reservoir of
secrecy, so that assertions of privilege on private matters weaken their ability to make
such assertions on appropriate public matters.
Even after the increased attention during the Clinton Administration, the scope
and, for some, the existence ofexecutive privilege remains controversial. The variety
of legal and political themes in this Symposium demonstrates that the tensions
inherent in executive privilege and related separation of powers principles will not be
settled soon. Still, it is the hope of the Bill of Rights Journal that this Symposium
will inform the ongoing discourse, and perhaps assist future administrations and other
officials to achieve effective governance by improving their understanding of
executive privilege claims.
IAIN R MCPHIE
2000] 539
